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	Which is intended to accord with the Aristotle’s principle that an object’s properties are in need of ontological support; that they must have a bearer or “substratum,” that of which they are “predicated.”​[5]​  A collection of properties being unable to exist ‘on its own’, there must be something in which they “inhere,” concurs Lowe.​[6]​ But he goes on to ask “why couldn’t it be the thing itself- the thing that has the properties,” that is the requisite substratum?​[7]​  This view of the matter would allow us to avoid treating the substratum as a “bare particular,” something indescribable.
	The thing itself or “individual substance,” according to Lowe, is a particularized “substantial form;” that is, an embodiment of a substantial universal, such as being a maple tree or being a horse (a sortal generally being involved in denoting such a universal).​[8]​ These forms, materially instantiated, are the substrata of inherent properties and relations.  The relation of embodiment, in which a form stands to some matter, is here treated as “sui generis.”  Lassie, for example, is (identical to) an instance of the substantial universal caninity; it is that which supports her properties, itself needing no ontic support, though it does stand in the embodiment relation to her flesh (the same relation holding between a substance and its properties, as these latter are also embodied forms).  She, thus, does not have it as a property; she is that substance universal, it is her “essence,” in which her accidents inhere as their substratum.​[9]​  In this way Lowe manages to reconcile the seemingly disparate positions Aristotle held in the Categories and Metaphysics.  Organisms are the “primary substances,” but so are their substantive forms, as the former are one and the same with the latter.​[10]​ The support of a substance’s properties, both accidental and essential, then, is what makes it what it is, its embodied substantial form.  
	Let us discuss the advantages of such a philosophy.  As just noted, it yields a substratum that is not essentially barren: substrata, according to Lowe, are not only formalized, but come replete with essential and accidental properties.  An essentially barren entity would be problematic because anything that has property of being essentially propertyless, has it either essentially or contingently.  If the former is true, then it is false that it has no properties essentially; if the latter is the case, then (given that all modal properties are had essentially) it essentially has the property of contingently having (the property of) essentially having no properties.  Those who reject essentiality of modal predications can reach the same conclusion by citing trivially essential properties, such as being self-identical or blue or not blue, had necessarily by all objects, properties, such as, being distinct from Julius Caesar, had essentially by anything having them, or properties such as being an ultimate subject of properties, had by any substratum.​[11]​  
	A second virtue is that it obviates the need, felt by the bundle advocating philosopher, to posit something holding together the properties making up a substance.  This tie could only be another property, if the view is to remain a bundle theory.  But the need then emerges for a second tie tying the first tie to the properties it bundles and a third tie tying the second tie to the properties it bundles, and so on.​[12]​  Responding to this concern, Arda Denkel and Andrew Newman speak of the necessity of “tropes” or uniquely instantiated properties being “compresent” or “mutually inhering.”​[13]​  What neither provides is a definition of this relation that does not rely upon the notion of belonging to the same substance.  Being compresent or mutually inhering in what, one might ask?  How can properties be compresent or mutually inhere without there being something besides them to which they stand in one of these relations, making them one?  Lowe is not burdened by this requirement because his substances are themselves singularities, units (in virtue of their forms).  
	His metaphysics also enjoys an advantage, shared by trope bundling philosophies, over the account whereby substances are reduced to bundles of “universals” or multiply instantiated properties.  As many others have noted, this view entails the impossibility of distinct substances being qualitatively identical, given an extensional understanding of bundles.  If bundle a contains the same universals as bundle b, then a = b (a universal, unlike a trope, can belong to more than one bundle/substance).  But then the substance that is bundle a would have to be identical to the substance that is bundle b, making it impossible for two substances to be qualitatively identical.​[14]​ A similar problem with reducing a substance, which is a particular, to a bundle of universals is that the latter is whereas the former is not capable of simultaneously occupying disjoint spatial locations.  Substances seem to lose their particularity on the universalist view.
	A trope philosophy, of course, avoids these problems by constructing substances out of non-repeatable entities, as Lowe does with his instantiated (substantial) universals.  No trope can be a constituent of more than one bundle.  Qualitatively identical substances would be distinct in virtue of the numerical distinctness of their (qualitatively indistinguishable) constituents (whatever number of pairs that happens to be).  Reducing a substance to a bundle of tropes moreover leaves it incapable, as it should be, of simultaneously occupying disjoint locations.  But the same is true of Lowe’s embodied forms, rooted in the discrete places of their material causes and excluding from them all other instances of their kinds.​[15]​
	But these gains, some might object are offset by a loss in explanatory power.  Whereas the univeralist view treats particulars as being fundamentally (sets of) universals, the above analyses leave them belonging to a basic ontological category.​[16]​ Their defenders may respond, however, that this aspect of their philosophies is actually one their virtues: we should not wish to analyze particulars in terms of universals, given what was said above concerning the difference between the ways in which their instances relate to space.  Thus, it is not clear that either Lowe’s view (or the bundle theory, for that matter) should be criticized for being non-reductive.
	Lowe can also account for change in a manner that is unavailable to either bundle theorist.  The latter is forced to abdicate either the distinction between qualitative and substantial change or an extensional understanding of bundle identity or the eternality of identity.  For if a material substance is a bundle of tropes or universals, then, a loss of any of its features entails its non-existence, unless a bundle can change its constituents.  But a bundle cannot change its members.  Identity holds eternally: whatever an entity is identical to at any one time, it is identical to at all other times.  A bundle, as noted above, is moreover nothing but its constituents; bundles are identical just in case every constituent of one is a constituent of the other.​[17]​  Thus, if qualitative change in a bundle is not tantamount to its destruction, then either a bundle is something over and above its constituents or it can be different constituents at different times.  Lowe’s material substance, however, is identical to the form that is its essence.  Thus, its other non-essential features can change without its existence being terminated: the (embodied) form in question enduring an alteration in its accidental properties.
	Lowe is similarly able to maintain the distinction between a material substance’s accidental and essential properties, which is problematic for the bundle theorist, since a bundle, as noted above, has no inessential members.  For Lowe, as noted, a material substance’s substantial form would be its essence; the remaining attributes being its character and accidents (cf. below).  Thus, he also allows for informative predications involving material substances as subjects.  Unlike the bundle theorist, on whose view any such predication is tautological (since, if a substance lacks accidental features, nothing can be said of it that is not necessarily true) Lowe may appeal to the just drawn distinction between a substance’s accidental and essential properties to mark the difference between necessarily and contingently true statements of which it is the subject.




	Which is an anti-reductionist account of material substances whose precedent can also be found Aristotle.​[18]​  They are, he tells us, echoing the Aristotle of the Categories, “part of the basic furniture of the world.”  They enjoy this status because substance kinds- denoted by sortals and having individuated particulars as instances- are themselves fundamental categories of being, irreducible to the “first-order properties (such as) colors and shapes” in terms of which they are analyzed by both bundle and substratum proponents.​[19]​  For the latter, belonging to a substantial kind would have to be a matter of a bare particular instantiating the properties that make up its essence.  But such an account is at odds with the contention that a substratum is essentially propertyless: there are not supposed to be any properties a bare particular has essentially.  But, then, it could not qualify as a member of any substantial kind.  The bundler, for her part, maintains that amongst the set of properties that is a material substance are those that make up the essence of its substantial kind, the instantiation of which makes it what it is, its remaining features being accidents.  But, as we have seen, a bundle of properties has no inessential members, making it impossible for the bundle theorist to mark the required distinction here.  A bundle, then, would also necessarily lack membership in a substantial kind.  
	The problem for both views, according to Loux, is that they have the order of explanation backwards.  A particular does not belong to its substantial kind in virtue of possessing certain properties; rather its membership in a substantial kind is the basis of whatever properties it has: its instantiation of a universal of an even more basic sort qualifies it to support properties.​[20]​  The key insight here is that “kinds” are also multiply instantiated entities, beyond the perhaps more familiar property universals in terms of which we characterize things: being a canine versus being furry; being human versus being rational.  Thus, like Lowe, Loux treats particulars as ontologically basic entities: neither analyzes them in terms of property universals or tropes.  His philosophy is, then, preferable to that of the bundle theorist for the same reason supporting Lowe’s: it avoids the problems attendant upon treating a singularity as a plurality.  Loux’s substances also come fully “clothed” with both accidents and essences, so he is also not faced with the problem of explaining away the apparent impossibility of something being essentially propertyless.   
	Loux himself notes, though, that his philosophy begs “difficult questions.”  There is first the matter of the relationship between a substance kind and its character: the attributes typifying its instances.  If, as maintained above, the former is not reducible to the latter, then what is the nature of their relationship?  It seems that Loux’s anti-reductionism is inconsistent with the fact that a particular belongs to a substance kind K sort if and only if it possesses the “family” of properties characteristic of K’s instances.​[21]​  
	But this matter was resolved above.  To wit, while it is true that there is a nomological connection between a substance kind and its character, its instances do not require bearers (each one is the support of all of its first-order properties) whereas, the instances of its character do stand in need of ontological support. Given the Aristotelian support principle posited earlier, the character of a substance kind is dependent upon the latter’s instances in a way that those instances are not dependent upon it (or anything else), making a substance kind irreducible to its character (or anything else), on pain of properties belonging to nothing.  (This view of their relationship is consistent with and would indeed explain the fact that the loss of character entails substantial change: a substance, as essentially a bearer of properties, requires them and specifically those entailed by its substantial form.)  In general, category S is not reducible to category E unless the instances of S depend upon instances of E in every way in which the latter depend upon the former.  Here Loux’s view benefits from being consonant with the idea that a substance must be capable of ‘standing on its own’- of being an unborne bearer of properties.  An instance of a substance kind is the ‘rock’ upon which its character and accidents are built.  It is in the nature of properties to be borne; it is in the nature of substances to bear, inherence being a sui generis relation.  We are simply stuck with positing both categories of being.
	Another problem facing anti-reductionists stems from the compounding and hierarchical arrangement of substance sorts.  Many ordinary substances do seem to be composites of “simpler” substances: a lake, e.g., appears to be a combination of a large quantity of water and a sizeable depression in the surface of the earth.  Also, substances typically belong to an ordered series of sorts, as with Lassie who was a canine, an animal and an organism.  Both of these facts are at odds with the view that all substances are ontologically basic in the sense of being reducible neither to entities of another ontological category nor to other substances. They do not, however, contradict the weaker anti-reductionist thesis that substances cannot be constructed out of non-substances, which is strong enough for Loux’s stated purpose of providing an alternative to bundles and bare particulars.  Maintaining the stronger view, Loux sees himself as obliged to supply a principle for delimiting irreducible substance kinds, something along the lines of:​[22]​

(BS) S is an ontologically basic sort iff a) there are not sorts R, R’, R’’ etc. all of whose members are Ss (i.e., there are no “sub-kinds” of S) and b) there is not some sort P such that Ss are composed of Ps

	BS, by requiring both hierarchical and mereological irreducibility, eliminates all but various sub-atomic particles from the ranks of basic substances.  Rescinding condition b,​[23]​ would fill out them out with the concrete particulars of everyday experience: e.g., trees, tigers, and human beings, instances of the lowest kinds in what Lowe calls “taxonomic structures.”​[24]​
Conclusion
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